The high-speed railways have recently been introduced on the political and technical agenda of Balkan States. Ideas about connecting these spaces to the European network are very seriously dealt with in this Eastern frontier area of the European Union. Although it still seems to be an idealistic project, considering the available financial resources, the presence of high-speed railway transport in public debates is still beneficial as it allows the drafting of questions and the identification of answer alternatives before the public money is wasted.
Maybe this is the right moment to speak some of these questions out loud approaching topics that are less dealt with, but which are, in my opinion, the topic base.
The first question is “what do we understand by high-speed”, followed by the related question “what is the operation model to be selected”? Technical literature and political documents offer a too broader range for the interpretation of the high-speed concept. Therefore, the interval comprises speeds of 150 km/h to 300-320 km/h (superior speeds being included in the “very high-speed” concept). Also, as regards the high-speed service operation model we identify variations of the dedicated line systems (with vehicles designed to operate within a closed system), but also variations of the mixed use of lines specially designed for high-speed with conventional lines. This way, we are from the very beginning confronted with a difficult problem reflected in the negotiation of necessary amounts, financing sources and last but not least, in the construction of a truly interoperable or cross-border coherent network. In the lack of a joint terminology, very spotted projects will appear on the Balkan map selling the illusion of high-speed trains. Similar examples are provided by Russia’s recent history, the country where line St. Petersburg-Moscow has been promoted as high-speed railway for years, while, in fact, the railway line that will permit trains to run at speeds of up to 300 km/h is still in the incipient construction phase. Slovenia has recently promoted the launch of the high-speed train service in technical conditions of speed of 160 km/h. Bulgarian authorities are also using the rehabilitation of Sofia-Vidin line for speeds of up to 160 km/h to launch a “high-speed” service Sofia-Budapest using tilting trains to reach maximum speeds of up to 200 km/h.
We are thus reaching the topic of correlation of projects and compromises. Because the project that all Romanian politicians are taking about concerns a dedicated line capable to reach speeds of up to 250-300 km/h on a route far up north than that drawn by the Bulgarian party. At the same time, the route of the “Bulgarian” service overlaps the southern branch of the pan-European Corridor IV on Romania’s territory, a route which lacks funds and constantly degrades while waiting for the opening of big reconstruction sites. These work sites will not be finalized before 2025 and plans stipulate the maintenance of a simple, electrified line for 100 km.
In the lack of joint efforts for the harmonisation of terminology and priority transport directions, European high-speed lines will be but another wheel in the assembly of social and economic division between the Western and the Eastern areas of the Union. Just as the supply need has stimulated investments in conventional lines, the social and geographical mobility of European citizens has to be the foundation of a European common policy for the construction of the high-speed network. Consequently, the risk of investing in lines that have no foundation because there is no real mobility demand (for example, Spain) is real.
by Ştefan Roşeanu
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