At first glance, doubling the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) budget for the period 2028–2034 seems like a strong signal for European infrastructure. The European Commission is proposing to allocate EUR 51.5 billion to transport under CEF 3.
The problem, however, is that the estimated costs for completing the core TEN-T network amount to approximately EUR 515 billion — ten times more.
In other words, even doubled, the budget remains insufficient. Under these circumstances, the stakes are no longer how big the CEF is, but how priorities are defined and who controls the allocation of funds.
An analysis published by Transport & Environment (T&E) points out that the architecture of the new multiannual financial framework subtly changes the logic of European infrastructure funding — with real risks for rail integration.
CEF vs. national plans: a risky separation
The new budget structure proposes a clear distinction:
- CEF Transport would exclusively finance international and cross-border projects.
- National and Regional Partnership Plans would cover the internal sections of the TEN-T network.
In theory, the idea is logical: Brussels finances connections between states, and governments take care of their own networks.
In practice, however, there is a major risk. If member states decide to prioritize other domestic investments—energy, defense, road infrastructure—the national sections of the TEN-T corridors could be postponed.
And without these sections, cross-border projects risk becoming “infrastructure islands”, well-funded but poorly connected to domestic networks.
European rail integration is not achieved solely through border tunnels and spectacular bridges, but through technical and operational continuity along the entire route.
What does “cross-border project” actually mean?
Another sensitive issue is the definition of the term “cross-border project.”
T&E argues that the indicative list of priority projects should be clarified and kept strictly preferential in order to avoid diluting funds to projects of predominantly national interest.
At the same time, the organization warns that cross-border projects should not be limited to isolated border segments.
To be competitive, these sections must be connected to major urban centers, otherwise they risk becoming underutilized infrastructure.
Expanding the definition to include major cities on international corridors can increase the economic impact of investments—but only where there are real and viable rail links.
However, there are also some questionable proposals. For example, the idea of a Stockholm–Turku–Helsinki connection without a direct land link is considered ineligible for CEF funding, while projects such as Rail Nordica should be prioritized.
Essentially, the dispute is about control of the agenda: if the list of projects is not clearly defined, the limited budget risks being fragmented among too many initiatives.
Megaprojects that consume the budget
Another critical point concerns megaprojects.
In the current financial year, Rail Baltica has absorbed approximately 20% of CEF Transport funds for the rail sector.
Reducing the maximum co-financing rate for projects in cohesion countries from 80% to 75% could free up resources for additional projects.
The 5% difference may seem minor, but in the case of projects worth billions of EUR, the impact becomes significant.
T&E also draws attention to the risk of late changes to projects that have already been funded. The example of the Porto–Lisbon high-speed line is relevant: the relocation of a station from a central area to a peripheral area threatens the project’s timetable and traffic potential.
The message is clear: CEF 3 should only fund mature projects that are ready for implementation, not concepts that are still politically or technically unstable.
Geographical balance and military mobility
The CEF 3 budget must be divided between civil transport and military mobility.
In the current financial framework, 44% of the EU contribution to military mobility calls has been concentrated in just four countries: Germany, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.
Strengthening the East-West corridor makes strategic sense in the context of European security, but there is a risk that Southern Europe will be underfunded in the area of civil transport.
The four priority military corridors subsequently established together with NATO should ensure a more balanced distribution, but geopolitical pressure remains strong.
In this context, CEF Transport becomes an essential tool for balancing investments and maintaining the original objective: the cohesion of the European network.
A question of priorities, not just budget
Doubling CEF resources is a positive sign. But compared to what’s really needed to finish the core TEN-T network, the amount is still limited.
That’s why the debate isn’t about “more money,” but about:
- clearly defining cross-border projects;
- protecting the budget from megaprojects that block flexibility;
- selecting only mature projects;
- achieving geographical balance between East, West, and South.
In the absence of strict criteria and clear control over priorities, CEF 3 risks becoming a fragmented instrument that finances scattered interests rather than the integration of the European rail network.
And at a time when rail transport is essential for both climate transition and strategic security, Europe cannot afford inconsistent investments.
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